

Russia DA

Aff Answers

Obama structurally weak

Obama can't deter Putin because the US sucks

Crowley 3/1/14

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<http://swampland.time.com/2014/03/01/ukraine-obama-influence-russia/>

Putin appears to have calculated that the benefits of maintaining control of Ukraine's Crimean peninsula, home to a large ethnic Russian population and a major naval base, would outweigh any costs that Obama and the West can impose. He's probably right. The prospect of a U.S. or NATO military response is roughly nil. The West has limited, if any, economic leverage over Russia. In fact, the leverage may work in the opposite direction as Russia is a major oil exporter at a time of already-high crude prices. Rhetorical shaming? Putin has endured months of it over his support of Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad, without budging from his position. Western support for Putin's domestic opposition would likely undermine its recipients and allow Putin to dismiss all protest as foreign intervention. So Obama is left to issue tough statements and place overseas phone calls, to little likely effect. By now it's a familiar story—and a particularly frustrating one, given the American public's unrealistically high expectations for presidential problem-solving. Consider several other crises that have left him stumped: In Syria, Obama stubbornly refuses to wade more than ankle-deep into the bloody fight against al-Assad's regime. He doubts whether the U.S. can influence the course of the war and worries that the risks of action—including an Iraq-style quagmire—outweigh the costs of inaction. His critics argue that he's wrong about that, a debatable proposition. But the practical result is Obama's pursuit a diplomatic solution that has gone nowhere, along with rhetorical condemnations of Putin, who supports Assad, that achieve nothing. In Afghanistan, president Hamid Karzai refused to sign a carefully negotiated agreement that would allow a residual U.S. military force in his country after 2014, saying he would leave that decision to his successor, who will be chosen in elections this spring. Obama has threatened that such a delay might require scrapping plans for a residual force. But with the stability of the Afghan government uncertain and al-Qaeda operatives just across the border in Pakistan, he wants to avoid a total withdrawal. Lacking any real leverage over an Afghan leader who seems willing to let the Americans exit for good, Obama endures Karzai's bluster and false accusations, while letting his deadline slide for deciding on a full withdrawal. And in Egypt, Obama has largely been a spectator to that country's ongoing political turmoil. His condemnations of a July 2013 coup—though he won't actually use the word—hasn't rattled the generals in Cairo, whose military aid he can't bring himself to sever. Meanwhile, bolstered by financial and political support from wealthy Arab neighbors, Egypt's military regime has ignored U.S. pleas for restraint and waged a brutal crackdown. Libya, Iraq, Sudan — all are places where terrible things happen that the U.S. can do little about. Obama's critics say he's been risk-averse, reactive and lacking vision. But even they would have to concede that American power is not what it was before two costly foreign wars and a budget-wrecking economic crisis. The result is a frustrated president whose foreign policy often amounts to tough statements which fall on deaf ears.

AT Ukraine Invasion Impact

Ukraine invasion spread non-unique – happening now Remnick 3/1/14

<http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2014/03/putin-goes-to-war-in-crimea.html?currentPage=all>

David Remnick, editor of The New Yorker since July, 1998, began his reporting career at the Washington Post in 1982. He is the author of several books, including “King of the World,” “Resurrection,” and “Lenin’s Tomb,” for which he received both the Pulitzer Prize for nonfiction and a George Polk Award for excellence in journalism. Remnick’s most recent book, “The Bridge: The Life and Rise of Barack Obama,” was published by Knopf Doubleday in April 2010. He became a staff writer at The New Yorker in 1992 and has since written over a hundred pieces for the magazine. In 2000, Remnick was named Advertising Age’s Editor of the Year. Since Remnick became editor, The New Yorker has won thirty three National Magazine Awards.

I spoke with Georgy Kasianov, the head of the Academy of Science’s department of contemporary Ukrainian history and politics, in Kiev. “It’s a war,” he said. “The Russian troops are quite openly out on the streets [in Crimea], capturing public buildings and military outposts. And it’s likely all a part of a larger plan for other places: **Odessa, Nikolayev,**

Kherson. And they’ll use the same technique. Some Russian-speaking citizens will appear, put up a Russian flag, and make appeals that they want help and referendums, and so on.” **This is already happening in Donetsk and Kharkov.**

“They are doing this like it is a commonplace,” Kasianov went on. “I can’t speak for four million people, but clearly everyone in Kiev is against this. But the Ukrainian leadership is absolutely helpless. The Army is not ready for this. And, after the violence in Kiev, the special forces are disoriented.”

Putin will invade Ukraine – solvency impossible Kalb 3/4/14

<http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2014/03/03-putin-russia-plan-ukraine-kalb>

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Having gobbled up Crimea, is he now planning to invade the generally pro-Russian eastern half of Ukraine, and split the country in two? Has he indeed lost “touch with reality”? Or, more likely, has he now concluded, pursuing his own cold logic, that he can recapture a large portion of Russia’s former imperial glory by moving aggressively against Ukraine—and doing so with relative impunity? Who, or what, is going to stop him? Putin is not mad, and he is not in “another world.” He is very much in his own world, which is for him a very realistic world of a new, frothy, determined Russian nationalism. Indeed, he is master of this world. Now that he has gambled—and won—on a successful, terror-free Olympics, creating a global image of a slick and modern Russia and inspiring ordinary Russians to be proud of their country once again (and polls show they are), he figured it was time to take on the chronic, nagging problem of Ukraine: put simply, whither Ukraine?—east or west? That question may haunt politicians and pundits in the west, but it does not trouble Putin. He knows the answer: for hundreds of years, Ukraine was part of the Tsarist and Stalinist empires, and it will remain in Russia’s sphere of influence. That is his reading of history, and that is his policy. When it seemed last November as though Ukraine might slip out of Russia’s tight economic and political embrace, and accept a loose form of membership in the European Union, Putin acted swiftly to smash this possibility. He offered then President Yanukovich a \$15 billion loan, plus a cut in gas prices, to tie Ukraine to the east, to Russia, thus effectively squashing the illusion of many Ukrainians that they were on the edge of genuine independence through formal association with the west. Putin wanted no part of that. In despair, Ukrainians organized widespread demonstrations in central Kiev. Anger deepened, as casualties mounted. Finally, protest leaders met with Yanukovich, a Russian emissary appointed by Putin, and the foreign ministers of Poland, Germany and France. They all agreed that Yanukovich would remain in power until December, when new elections would be held under international inspection. Within 48 hours, the deal collapsed, Yanukovich fled, and the Ukrainian parliament appointed a new and inexperienced government, which was greeted with guarded optimism in the west and obvious disapproval in Moscow. Over the next few days, top Russian officials, fearing they were losing their grip over Ukraine, began to blast the new Ukrainian leaders as “ultranationalists” and even “fascists.” Prime Minister Medvedev described conditions in Kiev as “lawless” and “extremely unstable.” It will end, he predicted, “in a new revolution...and bloodshed.” It seemed as if Medvedev was seeding the ground for a Russian military intervention. Last weekend, the Russians acted with uncharacteristic precision, suggesting lots of advance planning. They took control of Crimea, a strategic appendage hanging precariously from Ukraine into the Black Sea, where Russia has maintained a major naval base for many years. And, in addition, the Russians seemed to have their eye on the eastern half of Ukraine, where pro- and anti-Russian protesters were in frequent and bloody combat. The Kremlin, in a special statement, said that “any further spread of violence to eastern Ukraine and Crimea” would give Russia “the right to protect its interests and the Russian-speaking population of those regions.” Though stridently nationalistic and proud of the occasionally restless Russian masses, Putin is also a Russian leader fearful of popular unrest. When tens of thousands of Russians objected to his

election a few years ago, he let them demonstrate until the demonstrations became too blatantly anti-him, and then he stopped them. Putin hated the Chechen uprising and crushed it. He distrusts the rising Islamist rattling in nearby Dagestan, and aggressive Russian action there is considered

likely, and soon. And, obviously, Putin is prepared to use additional military force, if necessary, to keep Ukraine in his bailiwick. **What**

can the West do? **It can condemn Russia** for “blatant aggression.” Its leaders can threaten to boycott the G-8 meeting scheduled for June in Sochi, of all places; it can even threaten to kick Russia out of the G-8. It can impose a number of business sanctions on Russia. It may even produce an economic package to help Ukraine, but big enough? With strict conditions? And while this collective western

response to his moves against Ukraine may all end up hurting Russia economically, **it will not change Putin’s mind** about his controversial war-like policy in Ukraine. Years ago, when Russia was run by a weaker, older leader, namely Leonid Brezhnev, and Russia sent the Red Army into Afghanistan, ostensibly to save a communist government in trouble, the West wailed and President Carter decided to boycott the Moscow Olympics. East-West relations suffered, no doubt, but Brezhnev did not change his reckless policy. He did what he thought he had to

do to protect Russian interests and to project Russian power, just as Putin is doing right now. **Unless the West,** led by the United

States, **is prepared to use military power** to stop Russian aggression, **and that is not in the cards** for very good

reasons, **Ukraine will again be swallowed up** in the Russian orbit. Let us then hope that this sad result does not trigger a mindless political exchange between Republicans and Democrats during our November elections this year.

No More Aggression

Russia's deterred – no further O'Hanlon 3/3/14

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<http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2014/03/03/the-power-of-sanctions-against-putin-on-ukraine/>

The main reason for my relative **lack of anxiety** derives from the fundamentals of the situation in Ukraine. It is serious, to be sure. But it does not look likely to become **catastrophic**. As coercive as Russian President Vladimir Putin has been in this crisis, there have been limits. He hasn't killed people (so far at least, as of this writing on Monday, March 3). He is apparently trying to make a show of force in a way that gets a specific task done. He wants to protect his military bases in Crimea, where the Russian Black Sea Fleet (historically one of Russia's big four) is based. He also wants to assert certain prerogatives in a former Soviet republic. He wants, he says, to protect fellow ethnic Russians and Russian speakers — of whom there are many in Crimea and eastern Ukraine. There is nothing to admire about how Putin has proceeded. His approach is indeed 19th century-ish, as Secretary of State John Kerry said on Face the Nation Sunday. But it's not totally surprising for the way great powers behave. Even in this century. For example, the main distinction to draw between what Putin has just done in Crimea and what Washington did in Panama in 1989 — when a dictatorial government started to mistreat its own people badly and jeopardize our bases and access to the Panama Canal — is that we were more patient, and more justified, in making the decision to invade. In fact, we went further in that crisis than Putin is likely to do here. But Putin saw a government in Ukraine that he believed illegitimate. From a certain perspective, it had violated the February 21 deal that would have led to early elections, almost as soon as it was reached. He also saw the Ukrainian parliament last week look to degrade the status of the Russian language within Ukraine — an understandable reaction by angry Ukrainians at one level, to be sure, but also a provocation and a pointless one. I am hardly defending Putin. But I doubt very much that he is seeking to forcibly annex part of Ukraine. Part of his worldview may desire that, to be sure. But we have a pretty strong set of potential economic sanctions and Putin **knows it**. The West has gotten a lot better at applying sanctions — largely because of the Iran experience, and also our dealings with North Korea, and before that Serbia. The international community now knows how to do this — how to go after the banking sector, the individual wealth of top Russian leaders, their visa travel rights, and so on. We can try to help Europe gain new sources of energy as well, a point Danielle Pletka of the American Enterprise Institute wisely made when we appeared together Sunday on Face the Nation. Russia cannot thrive if the Western world collectively seeks to punish Putin and to do so for a considerable period. Were the current crisis to escalate to a bad situation — which it hasn't yet — and Ukraine to face civil warfare and an invasion by Russia to back up one side, then I think these kinds of tools would be applied. They'd be effective **and Putin knows it**. So I'm relatively confident **he won't take this gamble**, provided we are clear in our communications about how we would respond.

Interdependence will check escalation Dreyfuss 3/10/14

<http://www.thenation.com/blog/178761/capitalism-will-prevent-cold-war-over-ukraine>

Robert Dreyfuss, a Nation contributing editor, is an investigative journalist specializing in politics and national security.

plain, old-fashioned capitalism will **prevent a new cold war** between the United States and Russia over Ukraine and Russia's gobbling up of the Crimean region. Capitalism, plus the fact that probably not one American in a thousand could locate Crimea on a map, and even the most hard-headed US political analysts have trouble coming up with a decent definition of what US interests in Ukraine might be. Helping to contain the crisis is the fact that Russia, Europe and to a lesser extent the United States are tied together in a **powerful web of financial and economic ties** that didn't exist, say, during the real Cold War. Their influence runs counter to the many, many cries from hawks to impose tough economic sanctions on Russia, as if the giant Eurasian power were a small "rogue state." The Washington Post, for instance, said in an editorial: Some argue that the West lacks the means to damage the Putin regime or that the United States cannot act without Europe, but neither claim is true. Banking sanctions—denying Russians and their banks access to the U.S. financial system—could deal a powerful blow. Mr. Obama must respond to Mr. Putin with measures that force the Russian ruler to rethink his options. But, as CNN reports: Russia is the European Union's third-biggest trading partner after the United States and China, with goods and services worth more than \$500 billion exchanged in 2012. About 75% of all foreign direct investment in Russia originates in EU member states, according to the European Commission. In addition, Russia is the single biggest supplier of energy to the European Union. British energy firm BP is the second-largest shareholder in Russia's leading oil producer Rosneft, and some of the biggest energy companies in Germany, the Netherlands and France are invested in a joint venture with Russian gas giant Gazprom. And, in a lengthy interview in The American Interest,

Zbigniew Brzezinski points with regret to the fact that British bankers, who have large deposits of Russian cash—particularly from Russian oligarchs—are resisting any sort of confrontation over Ukraine: The British seem inclined to argue, “Well, there’s a lot of Russian money in our banks.”... The bankers doubtless have a lot of influence, particularly in political systems in which money is increasingly the mechanism that oils the “democratic process.” Earlier, the BBC had reported that a document carried by a top British official read: “The U.K. should not support for now trade sanctions or close London’s financial center to Russians.” The New York Times, in a long March 7 piece analyzing US and European business interests in Russia and their effect on the politics of the situation, quoted several executives with Western firms who clearly want to cool the crisis talk: European businesses “have no interests in any deterioration of the current international situation linked to Ukraine,” Frank Schauff, the chief executive of the Association of European Businesses in Russia, said on Friday. “We call upon all parties to engage in a constructive dialogue, which will secure stability, welfare and economic growth on the European Continent.” Among American companies cited in the Times are Pepsi, Ford and John Deere. The Times quoted Ken Golden, director of global public relations for Deere, in its piece: While Russia represents less than 5 percent of Deere’s total equipment sales, the company recently cited Russia as being key to its future growth. “We urge political leaders to solve this issue without violence and in accord with international agreements,” Mr. Golden said. Please support our journalism. Get a digital subscription for just \$9.50! It even extends to the defense industry. According to Defense News, in a piece titled “Amid Ukraine Crisis, EU Plays It Safe,” various European arms manufacturers, including in Sweden, value current and potential sales to Russia. France is apparently insisting that it will continue to sell arms to Russia, including a \$1.7 billion deal for two Mistral-class helicopter carriers. Said one expert quoted in the piece: It looks like the Europeans are extremely keen to do everything except anything that hurts their commercial interests. There is zero appetite to hurt business interests, and arms sales fit into that category.

Sanctions Now

Global Sanctions now

PressTV 14

(June 17, 2014, "US sanctions to target Russia key sectors" <http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2014/06/17/367307/us-says-will-sanction-russia-key-sectors/>)

The United States says it has closed ranks with European allies to impose further sanctions on Russia over the political crisis in eastern Ukraine. US Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Victoria Nuland told the German Marshall Fund, a think tank in Washington, that the sanctions will target Russia's energy, banking, and defense sectors. "We are well aligned now on what a next round of economic sanctions would look like, in addition to continuing to look for individuals who one would sanction," Nuland said. She also accused Russia of undertaking further efforts to aid anti-Kiev protesters in eastern Ukraine by sending tanks and rocket launchers. Russia already denied such accusations. The West and Russia have been on a collision course ever since the Ukraine crisis began. After Crimea broke away from Ukraine and rejoin Russia, the US and the European Union imposed sanctions on a range of high-ranking Russian officials and some business leaders connected with the Kremlin.

US Sanctions now but Russia is fighting them now

Khaleej Times 14

(June 22, 2014, "Russia challenges US at WTO over sanctions" http://www.khaleejtimes.com/biz/inside.asp?xfile=/data/internationalbusiness/2014/June/internationalbusiness_June61.xml§ion=internationalbusiness)

Russia has filed a complaint with the World Trade Organisation against the United States for imposing sanctions over the Ukraine crisis. Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev said. Moscow had already told Washington it considered the sanctions, imposed in response to Russia's annexation of Ukraine's Crimea and its involvement in the Ukrainian crisis, to be illegal under WTO rules. "When the United States imposed sanctions against Russia, which had a negative impact on our foreign trade, we decided to challenge these sanctions in the World Trade Organisation," Medvedev told a law conference in Russia's northern city of St Petersburg. "We've sent a communique to the World Trade Organisation." Washington and the European Union have imposed sanctions on several Russian and Ukrainian individuals, but Washington has also targeted a number of Russian firms and banks it says are linked to President Vladimir Putin or his close associates. In particular, it accuses Russia of backing armed separatists fighting the government in eastern Ukraine. A spokesman for the US Trade Representative said the United States took its obligations under the WTO very seriously. "Prior to instituting the sanctions against the Russian Federation, the United States carefully considered their consistency with WTO rules," he said. But Medvedev said the sanctions violated WTO rules, arguing that banning service providers from another country constituted an infringement of the "most favoured nation" status that WTO members accord each other. Although it joined the WTO less than two years ago, Russia has already become embroiled in trade disputes with the European Union and Japan. A flurry of Russian threats and warnings suggest that more cases could soon follow. He said challenging the United States may not be easy. "The US has both doctrinal and practical authority in the World Trade Organisation," he said. "The state is a leader in the raising of trade disputes with the WTO." He also suggested that disputes between Russian and Ukraine companies could be solved in an arbitration court. National security can be used as an argument to claim exemptions from WTO rules. The United States invoked national security as a member of the WTO's predecessor organisation to justify its economic embargo on Cuba.

More international sanctions coming now

Mohammed 14

(Arshad, foreign-policy correspondent for Reuters, June 21, 2014, "U.S., EU threaten Russia with more sanctions over Ukraine" <http://www.haaretz.com/news/world/1.600153>)

The United States blacklisted seven separatists in Ukraine on Friday and threatened "scalpel" sanctions on Russia's financial, defense and high-tech industries as more Russian military material has flowed into Ukraine. The U.S. moves respond to what American officials say is Russia's recent increase in support to Ukrainian separatists, including the provision of Russian tanks and the preparation of more to

cross into eastern Ukraine. President Barack Obama spoke separately on Friday with French President Francois Hollande and German Chancellor Angela Merkel, the White House said. The three leaders agreed that Russia faces the risk of new sanctions from the West if it fails to defuse tensions on the Ukraine border, the White House added. "They agreed that should Russia fail to take immediate concrete steps to de-escalate the situation in eastern Ukraine, the United States and the European Union would coordinate additional steps to impose costs on Russia," the White House said in a statement. Separatist rebellions erupted in eastern Ukraine in early April after street protests in Kiev toppled the Moscow-backed leader Viktor Yanukovich and Russia in turn annexed the Crimean peninsula. Eastern rebels have called for union with Russia. The U.S. Treasury named seven people, including separatist leaders in Donetsk, Slovyansk, Luhansk and the Crimean city of Sevastopol, whose assets under U.S. jurisdiction will be frozen and with whom U.S. individuals and companies will be generally be barred from dealing. The Treasury said one of the seven was a Russian citizen but gave no information on the citizenship of the other six. Separately, the U.S. State Department said it was confident that Russia last week sent tanks and rocket launchers from a deployment site in southwest Russia into eastern Ukraine and believed more tanks were being readied for delivery. "We also have information that Russia has accumulated artillery at a deployment site in southwest Russia, including a type of artillery utilized by Ukrainian forces but no longer in Russia's active forces, and believe Russia may soon provide this equipment to separatist fighters," said State Department spokeswoman Jen Psaki. A senior Obama administration official who spoke on condition of anonymity said Ukrainian officials told diplomats in Brussels that they had "evidence of some additional 10 tanks, fuel trucks, and additional supporting vehicles coming over the border outside of Luhansk in the last 24 hours." "We have information that additional tanks departed from a deployment site in southwest Russia yesterday," said the official. The official also said the United States had intensified its conversation with the European Union about imposing additional targeted sanctions on Russia because of the flows of Russian material to Ukraine. "We have been in active conversations with our EU partners on what we call 'scalpel' sanctions, which would be targeted primarily in the financial, defense and high technology sectors," the official told reporters. "The idea here is to deny Russia the kinds of investment and next-generation technology that it needs to continue to grow," the official said.

Global Sanctions now but no more coming

ITAR-TASS 14

(June 5, 2014, "Merkel: G7 leaders abstain from further sanctions against Russia" <http://en.itar-tass.com/world/734823>)

Leaders of the Group of Seven most industrialized countries (G7) decided to abstain for the moment from imposing further sanctions against Russia and intend to discuss situation concerning conflict-hit Ukraine with Russian President Vladimir Putin in France this week, German Chancellor Angela Merkel said. "At the upcoming meetings in Normandy we intend to send a signal to the Russian president concerning the necessity of de-escalation in Ukraine," Merkel said following the first day of the G7 summit in Brussels. "If this [the de-escalation] does not take place then in the future we intend to consider again the possibility of imposing the third set of sanctions." The European Union jointly with the United States declared two sets of sanctions against Russia earlier in the year, particularly after the republic of Crimea seceded from Ukraine and later merged with Russia. Speaking at a news conference late on Wednesday night, Merkel said the G7 leaders agreed to discuss three key issues with Ukrainian newly-elect President Pyotr Poroshenko and Russian President Putin in France. Firstly, she said, the leaders intend to stress the importance that Russia must provide "measures for de-escalation in Ukraine." Secondly, to call on the Russian authorities to begin joint work with the Ukrainian president. Thirdly, Merkel said, Russia needs to put an end to flow of volunteers and weapons to the east of Ukraine. Asked whether further sanctions would follow against Russia, Merkel said the issue "requires extra discussions and thorough analysis of the situation."

Arctic Conflict Defense

No arctic war

Keil 14

(Kathrin, Freie Universität Berlin, Otto-Suhr-Institut, May 16, 2014, "The Arctic: A new region of conflict? The case of oil and gas" Cooperation and Conflict 2014, Vol. 49(2) 162–190)

The evidence shows that talk of a new Cold War in the Arctic is overblown. Closer analysis of the actual importance of Arctic oil and gas to the countries concerned, as well as the consideration of the uncertainty and spatial distribution of Arctic hydrocarbons, offers a much more differentiated picture. The USA and Canada are unlikely to join a potential rush for Russia's Arctic resources given their own vast resource bases. Norway and Denmark both concentrate on their own hydrocarbon potential, because it is needed for economic and autonomy reasons, respectively. Activities concerning the most promising resources, Arctic offshore oil and gas, are currently of rather secondary importance in a global perspective. In the near- to medium-term future, however, increased activity can be expected.

Given the empirical findings, **it is safe to conclude that this will not lead to major inter-state**

confrontations, but if any conflict about Arctic natural resources were to arise, it will most likely concern complicated business relationships between the Russian state and foreign oil and gas companies wanting to get a share of Russia's vast hydrocarbon base to satisfy especially high European demand. In this respect, Russia is confronted with a delicate balancing act. On the one hand, it aims to protect its resources by declaring them strategic and thus strongly limiting non-Russian involvement in any development activities. On the other hand, Russia's economy is highly dependent on the continued expansion of its oil and gas production, which will be impossible to achieve in the future without foreign expertise and capital. This precarious situation is exacerbated by the overall risky and unpredictable Russian investment climate. It remains to be seen how joint exploration and exploitation agreements between Russian (state) firms and foreign companies will work out. After the failed Rosneft–BP agreement, the new deal between Rosneft and Exxon to explore and exploit fields in the Kara Sea offers a new chance of observing the development of such a joint venture (Kramer, 2011b; Washington, 2011; Werdigier, 2011). The empirical conclusions suggest, first and foremost, that it is of utmost importance to start the analysis of the political state of a region by critically examining the actual stakes and interests involved, rather than arriving at premature conclusions based on underlying assumptions. Closer empirical scrutiny indicates that neorealist expectations of a geopolitical rush for Arctic resources are unrealistic, while the addition of constructivist variables in empirical analysis can supplement rational materialist accounts of actors' interests. While the overall interest-based approach is useful to unpack the black box of 'Arctic interests', the constitution of these interests cannot be solely understood in rationalist terms but has to include identity, cultural and historical considerations of the importance of the Arctic region to the respective countries.

No escalation

Zero risk of Ukraine escalation

Peck 3/5/14

I'm a defense writer, avid gamer and history buff. I'm currently a contributing editor for Foreign Policy Magazine, a writer for the War is Boring defense blog and of course a contributor at Forbes. My work has also appeared in the Washington Post, Slate, Defense News, USA Today, the Philadelphia Inquirer and other fine publications.

<http://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelpeck/2014/03/05/7-reasons-why-america-will-never-go-to-war-over-ukraine/>

7 Reasons why America Will Never Go To War Over Ukraine

America is the mightiest military power in the world. And that fact means absolutely nothing for the Ukraine crisis. Regardless of whether Russia continues to occupy the Crimea region of Ukraine, or decides to occupy all of Ukraine, **the U.S. is not going to get into a**

shooting war with Russia. This has nothing to do with whether Obama is strong or weak. Jimmy Carter or

Ronald Reagan would face the same constraints. The U.S. may threaten to impose economic sanctions, but here is why America will never smack Russia with a big stick: Russia is a nuclear superpower. Russia has an estimated 4,500 active nuclear warheads, according to the Federation of American Scientists. Unlike North Korea or perhaps Iran, whose nuclear arsenals couldn't inflict substantial damage, Russia could totally devastate the U.S. as well as the rest of the planet. U.S. missile defenses, assuming they even work, are not designed to stop a massive Russian strike. For the 46 years of the Cold War, America and Russia were deadly rivals. But they never fought. Their proxies fought: Koreans, Vietnamese, Central Americans, Israelis and Arabs. The one time that U.S. and Soviet forces almost went to war was during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Neither Obama nor Putin is crazy enough to want to repeat that. U.S. Marine Corps vehicle during amphibious assault exercise. U.S. Marine Corps vehicle during amphibious assault exercise. Russia has a powerful army. While the Russian military is a shadow of its Soviet glory days, it is still a formidable force. The Russian army has about 300,000 men and 2,500 tanks (with another 18,000 tanks in storage), according to the "Military Balance 2014" from the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Its air force has almost 1,400 aircraft, and its navy 171 ships, including 25 in the Black Sea Fleet off Ukraine's coast. U.S. forces are more capable than Russian forces, which did not perform impressively during the 2008 Russo-Georgia War. American troops would enjoy better training, communications, drones, sensors and possibly better weapons (though the latest Russian fighter jets, such as the T-50, could be trouble for U.S. pilots). However, better is not good enough. The Russian military is not composed of lightly armed insurgents like the Taliban, or a hapless army like the Iraqis in 2003. With advanced weapons like T-80 tanks, supersonic AT-15 Springer anti-tank missiles, BM-30 Smerch multiple rocket launchers and S-400 Growler anti-aircraft missiles, Russian forces pack enough firepower to inflict significant American losses. Ukraine is closer to Russia. The distance between Kiev and Moscow is 500 miles. The distance between Kiev and New York is 5,000 miles. It's much easier for Russia to send troops and supplies by land than for the U.S. to send them by sea or air. The U.S. military is tired. After nearly 13 years of war, America's armed forces need a breather. Equipment is worn out from long service in Iraq and Afghanistan, personnel are worn out from repeated deployments overseas, and there are still about 40,000 troops still fighting in Afghanistan. The U.S. doesn't have many troops to send. The U.S. could easily dispatch air power to Ukraine if its NATO allies allow use of their airbases, and the aircraft carrier George H. W. Bush and its hundred aircraft are patrolling the Mediterranean. But for a ground war to liberate Crimea or defend Ukraine, there is just the 173rd Airborne Brigade in Italy, the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit sailing off Spain, the 2nd Stryker Cavalry Regiment in Germany and the 82nd Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. While the paratroopers could drop into the combat zone, the Marines would have sail past Russian defenses in the Black Sea, and the Stryker brigade would probably have to travel overland through Poland into Ukraine. Otherwise, bringing in mechanized combat brigades from the U.S. would be logistically difficult, and more important, could take months to organize. The American people are tired. Pity the poor politician who tries to sell the American public on yet another war, especially some complex conflict in a distant Eastern Europe nation. Neville Chamberlain's words during the 1938 Czechoslovakia crisis come to mind: "How horrible, fantastic, incredible it is that we should be digging trenches and trying on gas-masks here because of a quarrel in a far away country between people of whom we know nothing." America's allies are tired. NATO sent troops to support the American campaign in Afghanistan, and has little to show for it. Britain sent troops to Iraq and Afghanistan, and has little to show for it. It is almost inconceivable to imagine the Western European public marching in the streets to demand the liberation of Crimea, especially considering the region's sputtering economy, which might be snuffed out should Russia stop exporting natural gas. As for military capabilities, the Europeans couldn't evict Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi without American help. And Germans fighting Russians again? Let's not even go there.

at us-russia relations

Ukraine permanently tanked relations

Mankoff 3/14/14

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/03/14/who_lost_europe_ukraine_asia_pivot

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The most direct impact of the current standoff will be on Washington's relationship with Moscow. Although the U.S.-Russia "reset" was a signal achievement of Obama's first term, bilateral relations have cooled significantly in recent years. With tension mounting over Russia's support for Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria, crackdown on dissent and gay rights at home, and decision to grant asylum to NSA leaker Edward Snowden, the Obama administration made a conscious decision to de-prioritize relations with Moscow, cancelling a September 2013 summit and refusing to send a high-level government delegation to the Sochi Olympics.

Nevertheless, Washington attempted to preserve limited cooperation in order to broker an end to the Syrian civil war and roll back Iran's nuclear program. Even before the crisis in Ukraine, it was becoming clear that a second round of Syria talks in Geneva were going nowhere, and that the fate of an Iranian nuclear deal would depend on direct contacts between Washington and Tehran. Coupled with the drawdown of U.S. forces in Afghanistan (a priority area for U.S.-Russian cooperation during the reset), these developments were already reducing Washington's interest in partnership with Moscow. With its need for Russian cooperation significantly reduced, the invasion of Ukraine sets the stage for the U.S. to further disengage, and to pursue a harder line toward Moscow, likely for several years.

at ukr invasion impact

Ukraine invasion spread non-unique – happening now

Remnick 3/1/14

<http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2014/03/putin-goes-to-war-in-crimea.html?currentPage=all>

David Remnick, editor of The New Yorker since July, 1998, began his reporting career at the Washington Post in 1982. He is the author of several books, including “King of the World,” “Resurrection,” and “Lenin’s Tomb,” for which he received both the Pulitzer Prize for nonfiction and a George Polk Award for excellence in journalism. Remnick’s most recent book, “The Bridge: The Life and Rise of Barack Obama,” was published by Knopf Doubleday in April 2010. He became a staff writer at The New Yorker in 1992 and has since written over a hundred pieces for the magazine. In 2000, Remnick was named Advertising Age’s Editor of the Year. Since Remnick became editor, The New Yorker has won thirty three National Magazine Awards.

I spoke with Georgy Kasianov, the head of the Academy of Science’s department of contemporary Ukrainian history and politics, in Kiev. “It’s a war,” he said. “The Russian troops are quite openly out on the streets [in Crimea], capturing public buildings and military outposts. And it’s likely all a part of a larger plan for other places: **Odessa, Nikolayev,**

Kherson. And they’ll use the same technique. Some Russian-speaking citizens will appear, put up a Russian flag, and make appeals that they want help and referendums, and so on.” **This is already happening in Donetsk and Kharkov.**

“They are doing this like it is a commonplace,” Kasianov went on. “I can’t speak for four million people, but clearly everyone in Kiev is against this. But the Ukrainian leadership is absolutely helpless. The Army is not ready for this. And, after the violence in Kiev, the special forces are disoriented.”

Putin will invade Ukraine – solvency impossible

Kalb 3/4/14

<http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2014/03/03-putin-russia-plan-ukraine-kalb>

Marvin Kalb Nonresident Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Marvin Kalb is a nonresident senior fellow with the Foreign Policy program at Brookings, and senior advisor at the Pulitzer Center on Crisis Reporting. He focuses on the impact of media on public policy and politics, and is also an expert in national security, with a focus on U.S. relations with Russia, Europe and the Middle East. His most recent book is The Road to War: Presidential Commitments Honored and Betrayed (Brookings Institution Press, 2013).

Having gobbled up Crimea, is he now planning to invade the generally pro-Russian eastern half of Ukraine, and split the country in two? Has he indeed lost “touch with reality”? Or, more likely, has he now concluded, pursuing his own cold logic, that he can recapture a large portion of Russia’s former imperial glory by moving aggressively against Ukraine—and doing so with relative impunity? Who, or what, is going to stop him? Putin is not mad, and he is not in “another world.” He is very much in his own world, which is for him a very realistic world of a new, frothy, determined Russian nationalism. Indeed, he is master of this world. Now that he has gambled—and won—on a successful, terror-free Olympics, creating a global image of a slick and modern Russia and inspiring ordinary Russians to be proud of their country once again (and polls show they are), he figured it was time to take on the chronic, nagging problem of Ukraine: put simply, whither Ukraine?—east or west? That question may haunt politicians and pundits in the west, but it does not trouble Putin. He knows the answer: for hundreds of years, Ukraine was part of the Tsarist and Stalinist empires, and it will remain in Russia’s sphere of influence. That is his reading of history, and that is his policy. When it seemed last November as though Ukraine might slip out of Russia’s tight economic and political embrace, and accept a loose form of membership in the European Union, Putin acted swiftly to smash this possibility. He offered then President Yanukovich a \$15 billion loan, plus a cut in gas prices, to tie Ukraine to the east, to Russia, thus effectively squashing the illusion of many Ukrainians that they were on the edge of genuine independence through formal association with the west. Putin wanted no part of that. In despair, Ukrainians organized widespread demonstrations in central Kiev. Anger deepened, as casualties mounted. Finally, protest leaders met with Yanukovich, a Russian emissary appointed by Putin, and the foreign ministers of Poland, Germany and France. They all agreed that Yanukovich would remain in power until December, when new elections would be held under international inspection. Within 48 hours, the deal collapsed, Yanukovich fled, and the Ukrainian parliament appointed a new and inexperienced government, which was greeted with guarded optimism in the west and obvious disapproval in Moscow. Over the next few days, top Russian officials, fearing they were losing their grip over Ukraine, began to blast the new Ukrainian leaders as “ultranationalists” and even “fascists.” Prime Minister Medvedev described conditions in Kiev as “lawless” and “extremely unstable.” It will end, he predicted, “in a new revolution...and bloodshed.” It seemed as if Medvedev was seeding the ground for a Russian military intervention. Last weekend, the Russians acted with uncharacteristic precision, suggesting lots of advance planning. They took control of Crimea, a strategic appendage hanging precariously from Ukraine into the Black Sea, where Russia has maintained a major naval base for many years. And, in addition, the Russians seemed to have their eye on the eastern half of Ukraine, where pro- and anti-Russian protesters were in frequent and bloody combat. The Kremlin, in a special statement, said that “any further spread of violence to eastern Ukraine and Crimea” would give Russia “the right to protect its interests and the Russian-speaking population of those regions.” Though stridently nationalistic and proud of the occasionally restless Russian masses, Putin is also a Russian leader fearful of popular unrest. When tens of thousands of Russians objected to his

election a few years ago, he let them demonstrate until the demonstrations became too blatantly anti-him, and then he stopped them. Putin hated the Chechen uprising and crushed it. He distrusts the rising Islamist rattling in nearby Dagestan, and aggressive Russian action there is considered

likely, and soon. And, obviously, Putin is prepared to use additional military force, if necessary, to keep Ukraine in his bailiwick. **What**

can the West do? **It can condemn Russia** for “blatant aggression.” Its leaders can threaten to boycott the G-8 meeting scheduled for June in Sochi, of all places; it can even threaten to kick Russia out of the G-8. It can impose a number of business sanctions on Russia. It may even produce an economic package to help Ukraine, but big enough? With strict conditions? And while this collective western

response to his moves against Ukraine may all end up hurting Russia economically, **it will not change Putin’s mind** about his controversial war-like policy in Ukraine. Years ago, when Russia was run by a weaker, older leader, namely Leonid Brezhnev, and Russia sent the Red Army into Afghanistan, ostensibly to save a communist government in trouble, the West wailed and President Carter decided to boycott the Moscow Olympics. East-West relations suffered, no doubt, but Brezhnev did not change his reckless policy. He did what he thought he had to

do to protect Russian interests and to project Russian power, just as Putin is doing right now. **Unless the West,** led by the United

States, **is prepared to use military power** to stop Russian aggression, **and that is not in the cards** for very good

reasons, **Ukraine will again be swallowed up** in the Russian orbit. Let us then hope that this sad result does not trigger a mindless political exchange between Republicans and Democrats during our November elections this year.

impact d: no more aggression

Russia's deterred – no further O'Hanlon 3/3/14

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<http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2014/03/03/the-power-of-sanctions-against-putin-on-ukraine/>

The main reason for my relative **lack of anxiety** derives from the fundamentals of the situation in Ukraine. It is serious, to be sure. But it does not look likely to become **catastrophic**. As coercive as Russian President Vladimir Putin has been in this crisis, there have been limits. He hasn't killed people (so far at least, as of this writing on Monday, March 3). He is apparently trying to make a show of force in a way that gets a specific task done. He wants to protect his military bases in Crimea, where the Russian Black Sea Fleet (historically one of Russia's big four) is based. He also wants to assert certain prerogatives in a former Soviet republic. He wants, he says, to protect fellow ethnic Russians and Russian speakers — of whom there are many in Crimea and eastern Ukraine. There is nothing to admire about how Putin has proceeded. His approach is indeed 19th century-ish, as Secretary of State John Kerry said on Face the Nation Sunday. But it's not totally surprising for the way great powers behave. Even in this century. For example, the main distinction to draw between what Putin has just done in Crimea and what Washington did in Panama in 1989 — when a dictatorial government started to mistreat its own people badly and jeopardize our bases and access to the Panama Canal — is that we were more patient, and more justified, in making the decision to invade. In fact, we went further in that crisis than Putin is likely to do here. But Putin saw a government in Ukraine that he believed illegitimate. From a certain perspective, it had violated the February 21 deal that would have led to early elections, almost as soon as it was reached. He also saw the Ukrainian parliament last week look to degrade the status of the Russian language within Ukraine — an understandable reaction by angry Ukrainians at one level, to be sure, but also a provocation and a pointless one. I am hardly defending Putin. But I doubt very much that he is seeking to forcibly annex part of Ukraine. Part of his worldview may desire that, to be sure. But we have a pretty strong set of potential economic sanctions and Putin **knows it**. The West has gotten a lot better at applying sanctions — largely because of the Iran experience, and also our dealings with North Korea, and before that Serbia. The international community now knows how to do this — how to go after the banking sector, the individual wealth of top Russian leaders, their visa travel rights, and so on. We can try to help Europe gain new sources of energy as well, a point Danielle Pletka of the American Enterprise Institute wisely made when we appeared together Sunday on Face the Nation. Russia cannot thrive if the Western world collectively seeks to punish Putin and to do so for a considerable period. Were the current crisis to escalate to a bad situation — which it hasn't yet — and Ukraine to face civil warfare and an invasion by Russia to back up one side, then I think these kinds of tools would be applied. They'd be effective **and Putin knows it**. So I'm relatively confident **he won't take this gamble**, provided we are clear in our communications about how we would respond.

The invasion will fizzle out – no serious impact Ignatius 3/12/14

http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/david-ignatius-for-putin-a-possible-pyrrhic-victory/2014/03/12/109c6130-aa23-11e3-9e82-8064fed31b5b_story.html

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My guess is that Putin will be a winner only in the short run. The negatives for Russia have probably increased because of the events of the past month. Russia has likely lost most of Ukraine as a buffer state, even if it claims Crimea as a consolation prize. **The world simply isn't moving Russia's way**. A small sign of Putin's long-term problem is that **both China and Japan have pulled back from Moscow**, thanks to the Crimea adventure. China fears that the Crimean secessionist movement could be a model for Tibet; Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who had been warming to Putin, has shown solidarity with America and Europe. **Will the Ukraine crisis prove a major turning point**, tipping the world toward a new Cold War? Despite the obvious dangers of confrontation, many analysts say **that's unlikely**. Should Crimeans endorse independence as expected, the Russian parliament may raise the ante by voting to annex the region. But what may follow is a period in which the region's status is legally undefined and the United States continues to seek a compromise between Kiev and Moscow. Putin could disrupt that by encouraging unrest in Russian-speaking cities of eastern Ukraine, such as Donetsk and Kharkiv — and threatening further

intervention. But that risky course is unlikely. U.S. officials also doubt that Russia will sabotage the chemical-weapons disposal agreement in Syria or the international negotiations to limit Iran's nuclear program. Putin has a personal stake in both, and they are symbols of Russia's influence. If he were to scuttle such diplomacy, it would deepen Russia's isolation. Putin must also be careful about the domestic consequences of his Crimea putsch. Yes, it has brought him popularity in Russia as a tough, nationalistic leader. But it may also encourage secessionists in Dagestan, Chechnya and other potential breakaway regions. The Ukraine showdown, in a sense, has been a confrontation, as Kerry argues, between a 19th-century worldview and a 21st-century approach. Putin's moves on the ground have been decisive, with immediate impact. The U.S.-led response has been collective, deliberative and slower to emerge. The world was impressed initially by the "shock and awe" of America's military intervention in Iraq in 2003. One thing on which Putin and President Obama can agree is that the benefits of that military intervention didn't last.

impact d: interdependence

Interdependence will check escalation

Dreyfuss 3/10/14

<http://www.thenation.com/blog/178761/capitalism-will-prevent-cold-war-over-ukraine>

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plain, old-fashioned capitalism will **prevent a new cold war** between the United States and Russia over Ukraine and Russia's gobbling up of the Crimean region. Capitalism, plus the fact that probably not one American in a thousand could locate Crimea on a map, and even the most hard-headed US political analysts have trouble coming up with a decent definition of what US interests in Ukraine might be. Helping to contain the crisis is the fact that Russia, Europe and to a lesser extent the United States are tied together in a **powerful web of**

financial and economic ties that didn't exist, say, during the real Cold War. Their influence runs counter to the many, many cries from hawks to impose tough economic sanctions on Russia, as if the giant Eurasian power were a small "rogue state." The Washington Post, for instance, said in an editorial: Some argue that the West lacks the means to damage the Putin regime or that the United States cannot act without Europe, but neither claim is true. Banking sanctions—denying Russians and their banks access to the U.S. financial system—could deal a powerful blow. Mr. Obama must respond to Mr. Putin with measures that force the Russian ruler to rethink his options. But, as CNN reports: Russia is the European Union's third-biggest trading partner after the United States and China, with goods and services worth more than \$500 billion exchanged in 2012. About 75% of all foreign direct investment in Russia originates in EU member states, according to the European Commission. In addition, Russia is the single biggest supplier of energy to the European Union. British energy firm BP is the second-largest shareholder in Russia's leading oil producer Rosneft, and some of the biggest energy companies in Germany, the Netherlands and France are invested in a joint venture with Russian gas giant Gazprom. And, in a lengthy interview in The American Interest, Zbigniew Brzezinski points with regret to the fact that British bankers, who have large deposits of Russian cash—particularly from Russian oligarchs—are resisting any sort of confrontation over Ukraine: The British seem inclined to argue, "Well, there's a lot of Russian money in our banks."... The bankers doubtless have a lot of influence, particularly in political systems in which money is increasingly the mechanism that oils the "democratic process." Earlier, the BBC had reported that a document carried by a top British official read: "The U.K. should not support for now trade sanctions or close London's financial center to Russians." The New York Times, in a long March 7 piece analyzing US and European business interests in Russia and their effect on the politics of the situation, quoted several executives with Western firms who clearly want to cool the crisis talk: European businesses "have no interests in any deterioration of the current international situation linked to Ukraine," Frank Schauf, the chief executive of the Association of European Businesses in Russia, said on Friday. "We call upon all parties to engage in a constructive dialogue, which will secure stability, welfare and economic growth on the European Continent." Among American companies cited in the Times are Pepsi, Ford and John Deere. The Times quoted Ken Golden, director of global public relations for Deere, in its piece: While Russia represents less than 5 percent of Deere's total equipment sales, the company recently cited Russia as being key to its future growth. "We urge political leaders to solve this issue without violence and in accord with international agreements," Mr. Golden said. Please support our journalism. Get a digital subscription for just \$9.50! It even extends to the defense industry. According to Defense News, in a piece titled "Amid Ukraine Crisis, EU Plays It Safe," various European arms manufacturers, including in Sweden, value current and potential sales to Russia. France is apparently insisting that it will continue to sell arms to Russia, including a \$1.7 billion deal for two Mistral-class helicopter carriers. Said one expert quoted in the piece: It looks like the Europeans are extremely keen to do everything except anything that hurts their commercial interests. There is zero appetite to hurt business interests, and arms sales fit into that category.

impact d: no econ crisis

Doesn't spill over to global economy

Allen 3/8/14

<http://www.eturbonews.com/43477/fiscal-consequences-conflict-between-russia-and-ukraine>

Media Relations Specialist at IBISWorld Board Member at Citizen's Advisory Committee on Furnishing and Interpreting the Executive Mansion Past Senior Associate, Communications at The Century Council Copy Editor at The Breeze Communications Intern at Republican National Committee Volunteer at Delegate Matt Lohr Public Affairs Intern at National Association of Manufacturers National Journalism Center Intern at Young America's Foundation Government Affairs Intern at Boston Scientific

Unfortunately for consumers and businesses in the United States, neither is likely to be affected in the near future.

Producers are hedged against short-term fluctuations of global commodity prices, making it unlikely that the current conflict will affect prices for consumers at the gas pump or at the grocery store.

Long term: A tale of two stories

A continuation or escalation of the current crisis between Russia and Ukraine, could lead to potential sanctions and asset freezes and subsequently, global economic tremors. However, the direct consequences for the US economy are minimal. Neither Russia nor Ukraine is a significant US trade partner, cumulatively accounting for just 1.1% of the total export/import flow for the United States.

Econ risks low – insulated

Allen 3/8/14

<http://www.eturbonews.com/43477/fiscal-consequences-conflict-between-russia-and-ukraine>

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Furthermore, Russia is one of the largest exporters of oil and natural gas, with a significant portion of its supply piped through Ukraine. If supply is disrupted, or if fear of disruption persists, global energy prices could climb, leading to higher oil and gas prices in the United States. In turn, consumers and business would experience higher transportation costs, and subsequently, spikes in the prices of most goods. Fortunately for US consumers, because the United States lacks the necessary infrastructure to export its growing supply of natural gas, the domestic natural gas market is relatively insulated from spikes in natural gas prices.

Due to the region's essential role in the flow of global grains and energy, any disruption in trade relations will most likely not be aimed at these commodities. Only under certain circumstances will the supply of these commodities be impacted (i.e. if military conflict occurs, or if Russia coerces Ukraine by shutting down its supply of natural gas and oil). Overall, though the conflict is bound to influence the position of certain companies, the threat of large-scale economic turmoil is minimal.

Putin crazy – can't deter/bargain

Structurally non unique – Putin will keep going to maintain power

Shevtsova 3/10/14

<http://www.the-american-interest.com/articles/2014/03/10/falling-into-putins-trap/>

Lilia Shevtsova, an AI editorial board member, is senior fellow at the Carnegie Moscow Center.

never expected so many intelligent, perceptive, and influential media and political personalities to so easily fall into Vladimir Putin's trap. After the initial shock to the world, and especially to the West, following Moscow's announcements about the possible use of Russian armed forces in Ukraine, and then after being forced to acknowledge that Russia has already occupied Crimea, the West breathed a collective sigh of relief upon hearing Putin's March 4 press conference, where he suggested Russia doesn't have any plans to seize eastern Ukraine. I intentionally waited a while to make sure that this would indeed be the prevailing Western reaction after the dust settled—and it was. Western capitals felt encouraged by Putin. In the New York Times, that "American officials took some solace" after hearing Putin's explanations. One may suppose that the Europeans, who are much more inclined to forgive Putin than is Washington, have felt more than just relief, but actual satisfaction, at the news. When it became apparent that Moscow was hurriedly attempting to annex Crimea through a "referendum" scheduled for March 16—in the presence of thousands of Russian troops—some in the West have grown nervous once again. They're wondering why the Kremlin is in such a hurry, and why it is acting so crudely, without even pro forma attempts to clothe its naked aggression. But they needn't wonder. By now it's obvious that both Europe and the United States, unable to reverse the course of recent events and unwilling to pay the price for restraining Russia, are ready to participate in Putin's gamble. Until now, stunned and appalled, the Western capitals have been merely reacting to the Kremlin's moves, however belatedly or inadequately. But now the liberal democracies seem prepared to accept the new status quo—that is, to recognize the Russian annexation of Crimea as a fait accompli, since they do not dare force Russia to back down. They are now focused on stemming Russia's expansion to Ukraine's eastern and southern regions, apparently fearing that anything but acceptance of the new geopolitical reality will result in a much more dreadful outcome. Let us clarify what this reality is all about. First, it is about the destruction of the post-Cold War world order. This order was based on the premise that Russia and the West are not in the business of "containing" each other anymore, and that both support the principle of the territorial sovereignty of the independent states that emerged from the break-up of the Soviet Union. Moscow began to destroy that order as early as its 2008 war with Georgia, followed by the virtual annexation of Georgia's breakaway territories, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. No less than President Nicolas Sarkozy, during France's term of presidency of the European Union, ratified and legitimized the Russian occupation of Georgia's territories. And Moscow's interference in Ukraine's internal affairs and its use of force in dealing with Kiev dates back to the Kremlin's trade war against Ukraine in August 2013. So there's nothing new or strange in the West's inability to find a convincing way to react

to Russia's moves. **Moscow concluded some time ago that it was free to take additional steps** toward establishing the new order. Second, it is about more than just setting a precedent allowing the Kremlin's direct interference in the affairs of a sovereign state. Not only did its behavior validate the presence of Russia's spheres of influence, thanks to the lack of meaningful Western reaction, but the Kremlin also reintroduced the "doctrine of interference" under the pretext of protecting the "Russian-speaking population." Since Russian speakers live in most of the newly independent states, this "doctrine" threatens the stability of the entire post-Soviet space. Even Russia's willing partners—Belorussian leader Lukashenko and Kazakh leader Nazarbayev—understand the looming threat to their countries' territorial integrity, and so have stubbornly refused to support the Kremlin "solution" for Ukraine. Third, it is about paving the way for the second stage of Moscow's plans, which is to bring **southeastern Ukraine** under Russian control. This would make Ukraine a failed state and zone of instability, which will serve as an invitation to Moscow to "stabilize" it. One should even expect there to be Western supporters of Russia's "moderating" role. Indeed some have already hinted that Moscow has its "interests" in the regions that have to be "accommodated." And **Moldova is likely the next target.** In short, **Eurasia is entering a**

period of instability. I would argue that, so far, the Western political community has demonstrated a rather simplistic understanding of Putin's psyche and goals, and this has made it easier for the Kremlin to carry out its agenda. Here is a sampling of Western explanations for Putin's mindset and goals, proffered by various politicians, analysts, and journalists: "Because Putin can." "Because of 'Putin's appetite for expansion.'" "Because it's a 'land grab.'" "Because 'he wants Ukraine back.'" (If these explanations are true, then why is he only trying this now? And why was he interested in Ukraine, specifically, rather than, say, Moldova?) "Because Putin is afraid of NATO expansion." (But NATO currently has no plans for expansion.) "To prevent clashes between the nationalists and the pro-Russian population in Crimea and the East." (But there had been no such clashes, until Russia got involved.) "To protect the Russian-speaking population." (But why, then, hasn't Moscow shown any enthusiasm for protecting the Russian speakers in Central Asia, where their rights are genuinely being violated? And why is Moscow so interested in this group's fate in Ukraine at this particular time?) "To recreate the Soviet Union." "To start a Cold War with the West." (In my view Putin hardly looks the part of an insane person who has totally lost contact with reality. He hardly wants to rally the world against Russia to fulfill some sort of bizarre dream of going down in flames with his country. Besides, the Cold War actually had some rules that both belligerents observed; the Kremlin has demonstrated that it does not respect any rules.) As you can see, **there are major questions about most of the popular explanations offered** to explain the

recent events in Ukraine. I do not claim to have a monopoly on the truth on this or other questions. We political pundits have demonstrated how pathetic we are, not just when it comes to making adequate forecasts of developments in Ukraine, but also when it comes to explaining what is happening in real time. We all could use a healthy dose of humility when discussing these developments. With that in mind, I would suggest the

following explanation of the Kremlin's motives and its agenda regarding Ukraine. Annexing Crimea is not an end in itself for the Kremlin, nor is partitioning Ukraine. These are just means to a more ambitious end. The Kremlin's intervention in and involvement in the destabilization of southeastern Ukraine exemplifies, formulated by the Kremlin in 2012—13. One of the goals of this doctrine is to find ways to reproduce the traditional Russian state and Putin's regime, and to respond to new domestic and international challenges.

This doctrine is based on three premises: Russia is a "unique" civilization and must contain the demoralized West; Russia can only exist as a galactic center, around which orbit satellite-states; Russia is the civilizational pillar whose mission is to defend "traditional values" globally. Many have viewed the Putin Doctrine as an exercise in empty rhetoric, but Putin has proved that it is the real thing. He has also proved that foreign policy is now the key instrument serving his domestic agenda. What a lesson this has been for those Western politicians who believed they could rest their Russia policy on the basis of "de-linking" domestic and foreign affairs! We need to keep in mind that, even if a new imperialism and a hunger for land are behind Russia's recent actions, they do not fully account for the brashness of the invasion, nor for Moscow's open rejection of all accepted norms and principles of international order. The

invasion and destabilization of Ukraine are Moscow's means of pursuing not just the geopolitical goal of guaranteeing influence, but **a**

civilizational goal as well: **eliminating the very idea of the Maidan as an alternative to the**

Russian Matrix (namely, the Russian personalized power system and the individual's subjugation by the state). In the Kremlin's view,

the Maidan is the Absolute Evil, which must be erased permanently and utterly, with the utmost cruelty. The

Kremlin's Ukrainian campaign is thus a preemptive strategy with the ultimate goals of reproducing and preventing any threats to the personalized power system in Russia and the post-Soviet space. I also think that the flagrant and aggressive beating to which Putin has subjected Ukraine has certain psychological underpinnings. We might surmise that they also come from a desire to humiliate the Ukrainian state and nation, to both punish and terrify—pour encourager les autres, including Russians. In fact, Putin is demonstrating the judo style his coach once described: "You

have to hit first and whack down the opponent to scare the hell out of him, **forcing him to accept your domination**."

Actually, the Kremlin's tactics against Ukraine are the same ones it used against the Bolotnaya protesters in Russia: The government will use both psychological and physical terror tactics to ensure dominance and guarantee obedience—both here and over there. This is an up-to-date version of the Brezhnev Doctrine used in 1968 against Czechoslovakia, an aggression which was also meant as a warning to Soviet society. Ukraine has long been . The site of a stinging rebuke during the 2004 Orange Revolution, Ukraine now presents an opportunity for the Kremlin to exact revenge for both past and present Maidans, to teach the rebellious Ukrainians a lesson, and to warn Russians about the price of insubordination or attempts to escape the Russian Matrix. Yet another angle: Russia is warning the West, "Don't meddle—this is our playground!" But this is not the end for the Kremlin's agenda. Ukraine is supposed to test the West's ability to accept Putin's rules of the game. Let us not forget that this test has already been conducted once before, in Georgia. Moscow's decision to take over Crimea indicates that Putin has concluded that the West is ready to accept the Putin Doctrine, or that it can be persuaded to do so. The chain of recent Kremlin statements and steps—Putin's March 4 press conference; various comments by Kremlin officials, including Putin's Press Secretary and the Minister of Foreign Affairs; Kremlin press releases summing up Putin's talks with Western leaders (and first of all with Obama)—all signal the start of a new phase in Moscow's self-affirmation of its civilization-state status. This new phase will be characterized by a combination of "hot" and "cold" tactics: constant threats to use force beyond Russian borders, as well as a wide range of administrative, financial, and other pressure mechanisms. It's ironic that the Western leaders have been discussing "face-saving" options for Putin—moves that would allow him to voluntarily "de-escalate" the crisis. Escape valves are the last things on his mind: He's looking for ways to destroy the West's reputation and to force it to accept his way of dealing with the world. What the West is treating as a pause, perhaps even as a prelude to retreat, is in fact a new stage in the Kremlin's offensive. Just look at recent Kremlin rhetoric: At his March 4 press conference, the Russian President delivered an ultimatum to both Kiev and the West. But this ultimatum, which has been repeated by Russian officials non-stop since Putin first uttered it, is itself a safety valve for the West—couched in rhetoric allowing Western leaders weary of the Ukrainian headache to accept it without completely embarrassing themselves. Since March 4, Putin has repeated his former position on Ukraine: that the current Kiev regime is not legitimate. But he hasn't stopped there. He has also charged that Ukraine has been supplanted by a "new state" whose legitimacy he has also called into question. Moreover, he has listed several terms under which he is ready to deal with Kiev. These terms go beyond a desire to control Ukraine's foreign policy. Now Moscow is even telling Ukraine how to build its state, by calling for a constitutional change and a referendum, and by calling on Ukraine to accept the February 21 agreement, which would return Yanukovich to power. These are the kinds of demands one would issue to a protectorate or a colony. Besides, Putin has openly referred to the possibility of a military option if his demands are ignored. He has also reminded us that Russia has other instruments for influencing Ukraine at his disposal. When Putin mentioned that "Russia will not be sidelined if the Russian speakers are persecuted," he alluded to the influence Russia wields over gas prices and over Ukraine's debt. He's perfectly willing to cooperate with the "legitimate" Ukrainian regime, just as once cooperated with the Timoshenko government—as long as this cooperation is on the Kremlin's terms.

In short, the Russian President made it clear that Russia will not be satisfied with grabbing Crimea. (Who really

cares about Crimea in the Kremlin?). **Russia isn't about to loosen its grip on Ukraine** He has dangled possibilities in

front of the West's nose (for instance, he won't send troops into Ukraine unless it is absolutely necessary!) in order to get it to be more receptive to the Kremlin's other demands. Putin has essentially asked the West to turn a blind eye to any further moves by Moscow to establish its control over Ukraine. He even suggested that the West take part in "normalizing" the situation in Ukraine in conjunction with Russia. It is quite possible that the Kremlin believes (or has grounds to believe) that the West is ready for a repeat of the 1938 Munich Agreement and the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. According to the press release the Kremlin issued after the nearly hour-long conversation between Putin and Obama on March 7, the Russian President said, "These relations should not be sacrificed to differences over individual—even though very important—international problems." Translation: "What's done is done. Accept it, and we're ready to discuss other problems. But you need to understand that the world has changed." Even the West's current goal for the Ukraine crisis, to "de-escalate" the situation, is perceived in Russia not as a demand to return to the status quo ante, but as an effort to stop any further expansion by Russia. In other words, Moscow believes that the West recognizes and tacitly accepts the new situation. But if the West is ready to recognize one alteration to the status quo, why not another? Meanwhile, all the

talk in the West **about sanctioning the Kremlin** has only served to strengthen Putin's belief that the West will not dare to really hurt his regime. All of these sanctions—from imposing visa restrictions to freezing the assets of a limited number of people in the Russian elite—don't inflict any pain on the Russian political class. The visa restrictions on travel to the United States and Europe don't alarm most of the elite. Many Russian officials, alerted earlier by the threat of Magnitsky Act, have found ways to safeguard their assets. The Russian elite would stand to lose more if key figures of Putin's gang and oligarchs are closed out of Western banks. But there are signs that this is not going to happen—at least not anytime soon. According to a government briefing paper accidentally exposed to journalists by UK officials, the UK government should “not support for now...trade sanctions...or close London's financial center to Russians.” Similar briefing papers could just have easily been exposed in other Western capitals. Western journalists analyzing the issue confirm that Western financial centers are hardly ready to lose access to Russian money. See Michel Weiss in the , Ben Judah in , and Oliver Bullough in the . The Kremlin has nothing to worry about on this score, then. Moreover, the Kremlin is now opening a discussion about freezing and confiscating Western assets in Russia, demonstrating its ability to launch a counterstrike. So Moscow is trying to bolster the already powerful world business lobby, which protects the Kremlin's interests in order to guarantee its own interests inside Russia. The German business community is currently acting as the most fervent defender of the Kremlin's interests. The Russian regime will do everything in its power to make sure that the rest of the business community in Russia, as well as influential Western lobby groups that serve the Russian regime, will become more active in defending Russia's interests. They will force Western leaders to abandon their efforts to hurt Putin. The latest rhetorical nuances show that **Western politicians are cautiously looking for compromise with the Kremlin** on the basis of the new status quo, hoping that its appetite has been sated for the time being. Never before has the West had such powerful mechanisms for influencing Russia, thanks to the Russian elite's integration into Western society. At the same time, never before has the West been so impotent when it comes to using those mechanisms, thanks to the Russian (Ukrainian, Kazakh) elite's ability to corrupt and demoralize the Western political and business establishment. Mikhail Khodorkovsky was right to say that Russia's exports to the West are commodities and corruption. What about other means of pacifying Putin? Sailing an American fleet into the Black Sea? Doing this would only give the Kremlin yet another pretext to prove that the West is a threat to Russia. Cutting investments to Russia? Surely Putin has already anticipated this, and if he's willing to accept this risk, it means that the logic of the regime survival is stronger than the problems presented by a withdrawal of investments. An EU gas boycott, then? Who really believes that could happen today? But let's imagine what would happen if the West decided to start dismantling the money laundering machine the Russian elite has built with the assistance of the Western “service lobby.” Would that precipitate a moment of truth for the Kremlin and the Russian ruling class? I'm not so sure. The Kremlin has prepared for this eventuality. In fact Putin, having declared the need for the “nationalization” of the Russian elite (meaning that the elite must repatriate its wealth back to Russia), is ready for a new challenge along these lines. Moreover, if **the West were to cut off the Russian elite, that could only help Putin tighten control** over the political and business establishment. Those members of the political class who “come home” would become his political base; others would become the new traitors. One could conclude that Putin is fully prepared to close off the country and pay the price of increased isolation in order to stay in power. You might respond here by saying that Putin wants to remain a member of the Western club—the G-8, the NATO-Russia Council, the WTO, and so forth. But I'm not so certain of this either. Indeed he would like to prolong his stay in Club West, but only if he gets to set his own agenda. He doesn't necessarily want to remove Russia from the international system; he wants to align the system with his wishes, and he wants an endorsement of his right to break the rules. If the West isn't ready to do these things, Putin would be ready to turn in his club membership card.

From now on, he'll be breaking the rules—with or without the West's consent! In any event, **Putin is in bobsled mode**. He is **hurtling down the track; no one can stop him**, and he can no longer reverse course. But the more he acts to preserve his power, the more damage he will inflict on his country. Angela Merkel was wrong saying that Putin is living in another world. He actually fits rather well into his system of power. **Every new step he takes along this course makes his departure from power even more improbable, forcing him to take greater and greater risks.** Putin may be convinced that he is succeeding. He may think that the West is tamed, or that it is only capable of wagging its finger at Russia. Berlin continues to defend Putin against the possibility of any serious Western reaction. Obama is reluctant to risk precipitating another European headache. Russian society is applauding Putin's actions. **His approval rating is skyrocketing:** In March 2014 his approval rating rose to 67 percent (compared to 60 percent in 2013). A majority of Russians support the official view of the motives behind the Ukrainian conflict. In February 69 percent of Russian respondents accused the Ukrainian opposition and the West of provoking the conflict and the violence. Thus, majority of Russians are prepared to accept the annexation of Crimea and further Russian action in Ukraine. Thus once again Putin has the support of a nation that only yesterday seemed to be so tired of him! **He has regained control over the elites, too.** He has returned triumphantly to the scene as a War President and as a Triumphantist. True, we know how War Presidents end up. But at the moment his strategy is to focus on his plans for this evening and try to make it last as long as possible. Thus, **nothing could have stopped** Vladimir **Putin** from his current course of action. He has become **a hostage of his own logic**, and **couldn't even free himself if he wanted to.** He can't leave power, and **he can only preserve the regime by showing might**, strength, aggression, and recklessness. The only strategy left to him by political circumstances was to mobilize Russia by resurrecting a policy of containment of the West and by the search for new enemies. The inexorable logic of this strategy has even driven him to dig up old slogans from World War II about liberating the Soviet people from fascists and Nazis. **There's no stopping now**; this strategy dictates that **Putin must press on. The moment he stops, he is politically dead;** there are too many people waiting in the wings for their chance to knock him down.

Putin won't stop – ideology

Illarionov 3/17/14

<http://inforesist.org/putins-former-adviser-regime-of-yanukovich-its-a-kids-playground-comparing-to-putins-regime/?lang=en>
is lecture at National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy former adviser of Putin,

o what happens now? Putin's aggression that includes invasion by Russian military troops, taking over Crimean Institutions and attacking Ukrainian military bases, human deaths. Aggression is one of the biggest crimes against international peace and security. As well it's a crime under the Criminal Code of Russian Federation (Art. 353 and 354) . The first stage of this aggression – invasion of Crimea and attempt to annex. Those who believe that Putin's aggression will stop at Crimea are wrong.

In "Ukrainian Plan" that was developed long time ago that is only a first step. Next one will be to destabilize situation in the South and East of Ukraine. According to this plan, provoke local fights which will lead to the civil war. This situation in Ukraine will be the most desirable for Kremlin for the next few years. 3. One of the most important goals of "Ukrainian plan" is to represent Ukraine to Ukrainians, as well as to International and Russian community as a politically invalid country. Territory of chaos. Place of anarchy. A land of war against everything – West against East, Christians against Muslims, lefts against rights. 4. Putin's Ukrainian plan includes a third element and it's very popular argumentation among Kremlin's chiefs. They insist that what happened in Kiev was a violent coup d'etat. That present Ukrainian government is illegitimate. And that the only legitimate government, according to Kremlin, is at Crimea. Ministry of foreign affairs of Russia often calls present government in Kiev as "Nazis, Banderas, fascist thugs regime". So the third goal of Putin's aggression against Ukraine is the change of Ukrainian government.

5. And here we have a question – why to punish so hard? Ousted regime is Ukraine was a light copy of Putin's regime in Russia. Yanukovich's regime was a kids playground comparing to present regime in Russia. Both regimes are connected by the blood ties. So the fall of the first one is the huge knock out to the second. It's a death threat to the chief and symbol of the same regime at the North-East from Ukraine, but with bigger power and with more commodities. 6. Euromaidan – is anti-criminal, anti-Soviet/anti-Communism and anti-Empire revolution. The same kind of revolution that happened a quarter century ago at many counties of Central and Eastern Europe, but didn't realize in Russia, Belarus and Asian Republics of ex-USSR. Georgia had its own anti-criminal. Anti-Communist and anti-Soviet revolution in 2003. But Ukrainian "Orange revolution" of 2004 was not able to bring changes. And because today's Russia re-births communist's and Stalin's symbols, ideas and institutions, when present regime is clearly criminal and Russia reconstructs into Empire – to all that Ukrainian February's Revolution is the biggest knock out, that's a death threat to the present ideology and power structure of

Russia. 7. So what is Putin scared of so much in Kiev and Ukraine? Why does he hate so much independent Ukraine? Why did he prepare such a cruel vengeance? First of all – Maidan, a Public Democratic institution created by people. Second – possible raise/creation/appearance(?) of "Ukrainian Saakashvilli". A Person, that will represent all 3 elements of last revolutions at the post-soviet territory – Rose Revolution of 2003 in Georgia, Maidan Revolution of 2014 in Ukraine : the anti-Criminal, anti-Soviet and anti-Imperial movement .Putin's aggression is a punitive expedition against Ukrainians for the creation of the Maidan, for the attempt to break loose from the tenacious and sticky imperial entanglement. 8. To understand Putin, one must try on "his shoes", try to understand his

thinking and logic, try to imagine how he himself is seeing his task. He believes that he is chosen by the Divine

Providence to punish liberated Ukrainians by the means of destabilising the country, overthrowing the government, annexing territories, "unification of Russian land and of separated Russian people". He imagines that he has got a cart-blanch from Above to fulfil the "historical imperial dream". All the more so, he does not consider a neighbouring country to be an established state. He has said that much in the April of 2008 on the NATO summit in Bucharest. In his opinion, such country does not exist, and half of the Ukrainian territory is "ancestral Russian land". He believes that now there is a unique historical situation: Ukraine is in state of severe crises, its authorities and institutions do not function effectively. He dreams that the Providence demands him to fulfil

this mission. That is why if on the one side of the political balance is such a "historic mission" and on the other –

possible economic and personal sanctions, will he be afraid of the latter? Will the decision to exclude Russia from the G8

influence him? Will he care even about the exclusion from the UN, as was excluded the USSR from the League of Nations for a military

attack on Finland in 1939? He has a choice between the "voice of Providence" and noise of "some papers", he will

choose the former. And at the end of all, the sanctions will pass, but the land will remain.

War's inevitable – Putin panslavic ideology

Motyl 3/18/14

<http://ca.digitalnewsdaily.com/2014/03/18/why-putin-wont-stop-at-crimea/>

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Many Ukrainians in Ukraine now believe that a Russian invasion of mainland Ukraine is **inevitable**. If it happens, **war will break out** and thousands will die. It’s hard to believe that Putin will stop with Crimea. Putin’s former economic adviser Andrei Illarionov, who resigned in protest after a bloody hostage crisis, believes **Russian armies will march on Kiev**. Putin’s ideological mentor, Aleksandr Dugin, insists that Russia’s goals go beyond Ukraine into Europe — a **reunification of the Slavic peoples**. Meanwhile, Russian troops and tanks are massing on Ukraine’s borders. Terrified realists that we have become, we suspect the worst: that **they will soon be attacking** a country that dared say no to Putin.

It’s irrational – Russian invasion based on INSANE HOMOPHOBIA Snyder 3/1/14

<http://www.newrepublic.com/article/116812/how-europe-should-respond-russian-intervention-ukraine>

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In dispatching troops to Ukraine, Russia has violated international law, flouted multiple treaty commitments, and set the stage for a European war. **It has no casus belli**, aside from an eccentric understanding of the domestic politics of a neighboring country. The Kremlin’s surreal warmongering is bad enough, and obviously demands a response from the European Union, the entity that, beyond Ukraine itself, is most immediately concerned. Ukraine borders on four European Union members, and its new government has made joining the EU its foreign policy priority. Russian intervention in Ukraine is directed against the EU, which Moscow has now decided is a threat to its interests and indeed a civilizational challenge. **President Putin’s global crusade against gays has become, during these last few weeks, a specific foreign policy doctrine** directed against the EU. The Kremlin has made clear that **control of Ukraine is one step towards the creation of a Eurasian Union, which will reject European “decadence” in favor of** a defense of Christian **heterosexuality et** c. For months **press organs** close to the Kremlin have referred to Europe as **“Gayropa.”**

Putin’s personally vengeful – only regime change solves Gessem 3/21/14

http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/foreigners/2014/03/putin_s_crimea_revenge_ever_since_the_u_s_bombed_kosovo_in_1999_putin_has.2.html

Masha Gessen is a Russian-American journalist who is the author of Words Will Break Cement: The Passion of Pussy Riot and co-editor of Gay Propaganda: Russian Love Stories.

This raises three questions. First, if Putin thinks he is paying the West back for Kosovo, why has he waited so long to strike? Second, what could the United States have done differently to avoid setting off this long and frightening chain reaction? And finally, what can the United States do now? In retrospect, the long wait makes perfect sense. Once Putin held power in Russia, he never planned to cede it, so he had all the time in the world. Two of **Putin’s key character traits are vengefulness** and opportunism. **He relishes his grudges and finds motivation in them**: He has enjoyed holding the bombing of Yugoslavia against the United States all these years—and knowing he would strike back some day. He is anything but a strategic planner, so this knowledge was abstract until it wasn’t, when the opportunity to grab Crimea presented itself. Revenge has been sweet, but **when other opportunities present themselves**—and this will happen more often now, at least from Putin’s point of view—he will deploy Russian military force or the threat of Russian military force in other neighboring countries. **He will take his revenge not only cold but plentifully.** Could the United States and its allies have undertaken anything other than military intervention to resolve the Kosovo crisis? In fact, they did. After the bombing campaign, which strengthened support for Milosevic and weakened his opponents, the U.S. poured cash into rebuilding the Serbian opposition. The funding was contingent on the disparate opposition groups agreeing to work together and attending regular coordination meetings held in Budapest, Hungary, and run by people whom participants understood to represent the State Department. The plan for the anti-Milosevic revolution was

worked out in these meetings down to the smallest detail, including where the leaders of each of the 18 participating political organizations would be if mass protests broke out in Belgrade. They did, in October 2000, and Milosevic didn't seem to know what hit him. Could a plan like that have been carried out without the NATO bombing campaign? Could Milosevic have been removed sooner without the bombing? I think so. On the other hand, would he have succeeded in killing and displacing many more people in Kosovo before being deposed, if it hadn't been for the NATO intervention? This is an impossible question to answer. What we do know is that Yugoslavia's wars were very much one man's wars, and it was the removal of that man from power, not the bombing, that finally ended them. Russia's wars are, similarly, Putin's wars. It is also impossible to know whether Putin would have happened to Russia if it had not been for the bombing of Yugoslavia. I believe he would not have. But now that he has been in power for more than 14 years and is planning to stay forever, what should the United States do? Bombing Moscow does not seem to be an option. But helping the Russian opposition in the same committed, involved, and even meddling manner as the U.S. once helped the Serbian opposition should be **. Putin already believes** the U.S. State Department is backing the few protest activists left in Moscow—and is punishing the activists for it. There are many differences between Putin today and Milosevic 15 years ago, all of which boil down to the fact that Putin is a lot stronger and harder to remove—all the more reason for the U.S. to put its best minds to work on helping Russians accomplish just this. It **may be our only chance of righting the course of history.**

Putin can't stop – ideological commitment and conspiracy theorist6

Talbott 3/14/14

http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/03/putin-on-the-couch-104647_Page3.html#ixzz2x0ms8dKr

Strobe Talbott, president of the Brookings Institution, served in the State Department from 1993 to 2001, first as U.S. ambassador-at-large to the former Soviet Union and then as deputy secretary of state.

Read more: http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/03/putin-on-the-couch-104647_Page3.html#ixzz2x0mz4HHp

Three things to keep in mind about Putin as he prepares to annex Crimea: 1) He's committed to his own version of rollback—i.e., not just stopping but reversing what he sees as the across-the-board capitulation of Russia to the West going back to the late Mikhail

Gorbachev period; 2) When assessing a crisis, his instinct is to believe and react to **the most extreme conspiracy**

theory that his advisers and intelligence services tell him about the actions and motives of the West; and 3) As the flipside of No. 2,

he believes in **the best case** of what his bold and/or stealthy actions will produce (e.g., that the Russian speakers of eastern

Ukraine would welcome Putin's invasion and are in favor of returning to the bosom of Mother Russia). As for the endgame, it's not just replacing the Ukrainian flag with the Russian tricolor over the government buildings in Crimea—it's to use Crimea as a beachhead to destabilize as much of the rump state of Ukraine as possible and, very likely, also to apply the Crimean precedent to the

Russian-majority Transnistria region in **Moldova.**

Can't deter

Deterrence strategy fails – rally round the bear

Shevtsova 3/10/14

<http://www.the-american-interest.com/articles/2014/03/10/falling-into-putins-trap/>

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Does it mean that the West is trapped? Does it mean that whatever it does, it will only help Putin in his desperate gamble? The West's current tactics to calm Putin down—“de-escalation” and “diplomatic conclusions” without definite resolve—will only feed the Kremlin's sense of impunity. However, if the West were to develop a strategy that had as its goal influencing the part of the Russian elite that will lose out most if Russia turns into a “cast-into-concrete” state, it could cause a split in the Russian establishment, hopefully leading to the emergence of forces inside Russia that would break it out of its trap. Not soon, but with time. Current Western tactics, however, are only serving to consolidate Russia's elites around their leader.

putin's gone mad ext

EVEN through Putin WAS a realist, he has GONE MAD Kuchins 3/14/14

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Read more: http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/03/putin-on-the-couch-104647_Page5.html#ixzz2x0sOEFgi

My read on Putin over his decade and a half in power is that he is a brutally cold, calculating pragmatist in foreign and security policy, combining pursuit of his perception of Russian national interests, which almost always correspond with Russian public opinion, along with his main goal of preserving his political power. My deep concern, however, is that the Putin we have seen since the stealth Russian military occupation of Crimea has become **unhinged;** that his deeply rooted anger at the West coupled with his failing Ukraine policy led him to a decision on Crimea that defies logic. If the goal is influencing any Ukrainian government to be more pro-Russian, this move has backfired. He has done more to promote Ukrainian national identity in the past several days than any Ukrainian politician ever could. If the goal is to advance his pet post-Soviet integration project, I am afraid that the impact on capitals from Baku to Astana and everywhere in between has been to scare the daylights out of political elites to run from rather than run to Moscow. If somehow this is to enhance Russia's overall geopolitical position in the world, Putin is weakening his options rather than strengthening them. I will not even bother to spend time on the near- and longer-term economic impact, but prosperity is the principal reason he has been popular with Russians over his long tenure, not bare-chested machismo. **The frightening thing is** **that he appears to believe his own propaganda and lies.** Official Russian positions about justifying Crimea have absolutely no legal basis. Right now, **any diplomatic solution seems impossible** when Putin says black is white and vice versa. More dangerously, he seems to be operating on a mistaken and outdated perception of Ukrainian nationhood. While there are deep political cleavages in Ukraine broadly between east and west, the country has been independent for more than 20 years. Even those in the more Russian east and south do not seem to be clamoring for breaking up Ukraine. **Putin's miscalculation has led us very** **dangerously to the reality of a war** between Ukraine and Russia that will have disastrous consequences for all of us, and especially Ukrainians and Russians.

at “putin not crazy”

Russia can’t be stopped – it’s national ideology not Putin psychology

Shevtsova 3/25/14

<http://carnegie.ru/eurasiaoutlook/?fa=55081>

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True, there are a growing number of Western experts and politicians who acknowledge the gravity of the situation. But they try to concentrate on one issue—the Russian invasion and annexation of Crimea. As if this is just a paranoid deviation of the Kremlin’s policy, or the result of President Vladimir Putin becoming delusional. Let’s deal with this annexation and return to the business as usual, say the new Realists.

I agree with Philip Zelikow who in his recent Financial Times article (“We Require a Strategy Not Just a Reaction to Russia”) writes, “In the West, the conversation is dominated by discussion of how to punish and isolate Russia for its role in the invasion and annexation of Crimea. That is a reaction not a strategy.” Exactly! But what strategy does Zelikow suggest? A “new international agreement” that will aim “to protect a new status quo.” This means that the West has to agree to the Russian annexation and think about how to prevent further Russian incursions. This is exactly what the Kremlin would expect from the West—to endorse the current status quo, which the Kremlin will see as an invitation for new adventures.

Those who believe that the Kremlin will be satisfied with Crimea and will agree to return to a new “reset” do not understand the nature of the Russian personalized power and its logic.

Let me explain: what the Kremlin is doing on the global stage today does not reflect Putin’s venom, or aggressiveness, or him being “delusional.” This is the result of the Iron Logic of the Russian Matrix that tries to prolong its life into perpetuity at the expense of breaking the rules and even destroying the world order. Thus, “international agreement” on the new status quo will not solve anything if the political regime has decided to survive by turning to the War Paradigm and will be looking for a pretext to keep the nation in the War mood.

AT Arctic Link

Russia posture is defensive

Blanchfield 14

(Mike, Canadian Press, January 31, 2014, "Russia downplays Arctic military" l/n)

Vladimir Putin's senior Arctic envoy has defended Russia's military buildup in the north, saying it is not directed at Canada or any of its allies. Anton Vasiliev, Russia's ambassador at large for the Arctic, told The Canadian Press that Russia is solely concerned with defending its own vast northern regions, which are becoming more vulnerable due to climate change. Vasiliev said Russia once had a naturally secure border of 20,000 kilometres of ice, but that is literally melting away as temperatures rise in the Arctic. "Now the climate is getting milder, the ice is retreating and we simply need to protect our borders from illegal trafficking, illegal border crossing, mass crime, terrorism, narco-trafficking - all these bad things that come through this porous border," Vasiliev said Thursday in an interview. Russia, Canada, the United States and their five other Arctic Council members all enjoy good military co-operation, he said, stressing that his country's military buildup is not meant to be provocative to any of them. "We don't feel there is a militarization of the Arctic," Vasiliev said. "But there is a growing interest for more military presence, more mobilization of military forces going on in each and every Arctic state, including Russia, and we are quite open about that." He said Russia is also keenly interested in protecting the emerging northern sea route. With growing ship traffic, there will be a need to protect critical infrastructure such as the oil rigs that are expected to become a key feature in the Arctic's future. Russia is encouraging its Arctic Council allies to bolster their military assets in the Arctic, Vasiliev added.